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‘The Case of Nikko jiken: Occupation, reform, power and conflict’1
Dr Christine de Matos
Research Fellow
CAPSTRANS
University of Wollongong

Introduction
Many significant industrial disputes occurred during the Allied Occupation of Japan (19451952) that contested ‘the balance of power between organized labor and management’.2 The
most famous include the Yomiuri disputes of 1945 and 1946, the T*h* Motion Pictures
conflicts of 1946-50 (the third most famously known for Japanese police and US intervention
so visible that the ‘only thing … lacking were the warships’3), and the general strike ban of 1
February 1947. Nikko jiken,4 otherwise known as the ‘Hiroshima Incident’, occurred at the
Japan Steel Manufacturing Company in Hiroshima (Nihon Seikosho) in 1949. It was a
smaller but nonetheless contentious and symbolic labour dispute, and occurred in the
peripheries rather than centre (Tokyo) of occupation power.5 Nikko jiken symbolises many of
the conflicts between the occupation reforms and the exercise of power, and within Japanese
society. These include not only the contestable relations between management and workers
in defining postwar Japanese labour relations, but also relations between the occupier and
worker occupied/management occupied, the conflict between civilian idealistic and military
strategic aims of the Occupation, and of the impact of international cold war politics on the
1
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downloaded for fair use under the Copyright Act (1954), its later amendments and other relevant
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Jiken can be translated as ‘incident’.
5
Michel Foucault, ‘Two lectures’ in Foucault, Power/Knowledge, pp. 96-97, refers to the ‘extremities’
of power, on which I base the use of ‘peripheries’ of power.
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Japanese workers at the peripheries of the Occupation. Nikko jiken is also unique in that it
involved Australian occupation forces, not just American.
Current occupation literature, including that examining industrial disputes during the
Occupation era, is dominated by the US experience in the main centres of the Occupation,
especially Tokyo.6 Literature on the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) is
smaller in volume, and tends towards painting the broader picture, rarely referring to relations
between the occupation troops and the Japanese labour movement.7 Using government
documents from Australia and the United States and Japanese oral testimonies and memoirs,
this paper both complements and contests the existing literature by examining, as a case
study, a local industrial dispute in the Australian area of Occupation. This case study sheds
light on the execution and impact of the Occupation at the subnational level and reveals the
oft disparities that existed between the reformist ideals of the occupiers and the exigencies of
military occupation.
The Background: Australian soldiers and Japanese workers
Japanese workers were ‘liberated’ by the early Occupation reforms related to labour and
political rights. The 1945 Trade Union Law, the 1946 Labor Relations Adjustment Law and
the 1947 Labor Standards Law both prescribed rights and proscribed certain behaviours (for
example political activities) for workers. The Japanese labour movement vigorously
embraced their new role. This alarmed their US overseers, who feared the growing
communist influence on trade unions and did not anticipate the level of agency and
independence of the Japanese workers. Rather, they had conceived themselves as the tutors
of diligent and obedient Japanese ‘student-workers’. The Australian Labor government
(under Ben Chifley, 1945-1949) was less alarmed by these developments, indeed believed
6
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they had not yet gone far enough, and pursued a little-known policy of promoting an active,
politicised labour and trade union movement in Japan.8
BCOF officially took over the administration of the Hiroshima prefecture from US forces in
March 1946, and the headquarters was established in the former naval base city of Kure. By
1948, the other participating Commonwealth nations (New Zealand, Britain and British India)
had left, only to return at the outbreak of the Korean War. Thus Australia was left for several
years as the sole representative of BCOF. Australian forces stayed until 1952 (some to 1956
with British Commonwealth Forces Korea (BCFK)), commanded BCOF throughout the
Occupation, and left both positive and negative legacies in the area under their administration.
At its height, there were 12,000 Australians in BCOF.9 Australian military policy in Japan
was less tolerant and more suspicious of worker militancy than that of the Labor government.
Nihon Seikosho (abbreviated to Nikko), or the Japan Steel Manufacturing Company,10 was
founded in 1907 in Muroran on Hokkaido as a joint venture with British companies W.G.
Armstrong, Whitworth & Co Ltd and Vickers Sons & Maxim Ltd.11 From the beginning, the
aim of the collaboration was to produce domestic weapons for Japan.12 By the end of the
Asia-Pacific War, Nikko was the largest private weapons manufacturer in Japan, but after the
war was forced to convert to production for civilian needs.13 By 1949, Nikko was in financial
trouble.
The events/jiken
The year 1949 was a highly contentious one in occupied Japan. Detroit banker Joseph Dodge
began implementing his ‘Nine Point Stabilization Program’, or ‘Dodge Line’, which included
measures of retrenchment, tax division, wage stabilisation, cost increases (for example rice,
transportation), and funding reduction to education and public services. Dodge and General
Douglas MacArthur (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, or SCAP) acknowledged
that the program would ‘of necessity include measures which will be unpalatable and will
8
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create temporary hardships’.14 Anti-communist sentiment was also reaching its zenith in
occupied Japan, especially in reaction to the election of 35 communists to the Diet. While
SCAP/GHQ15 did not approve of Yoshida’s desire to create an Un-Japanese activities
committee, there were no objections to more covert means being used to eradicate the
perceived communist influence. These means evolved into two main forms: the ‘red purge’
to remove communists, sympathisers and other worker activists from government jobs (later
extended to the private sector); and the use of ‘democratization leagues’, or non-communist
unions aligned to the employer, to split unions. These developments provided employers with
an opportunity to both save money in wages and to get rid of ‘troublesome workers’ – a
retrenchment program justified by the Dodge Line, and one that would target workers whose
trade union activities coloured them a shade too reddish. In the case of Nikko, the
retrenchment program was euphemistically called an ‘enterprise readjustment program’.16
Nikko announced the retrenchment of 622 of its 2073 workers17 due to ‘financial difficulties’
on 2 June 1949.18 Worker groups quickly moved into action, and the following represents a
mere outline of the incident.
The Nikko Labor Union first asked the Council of Labor Unions in the Hiroshima Area for
assistance.19 On 7 June, the Nikko ‘problem’ was discussed at the Council’s Executive
Committee (held at the Ch;goku Shinbun Newspaper Company). A Standing Committee was
appointed in charge of the Nikko ‘problem’,20 and Nikko workers began to strike on 10 June.
Over the next few days, the intensity of the incident continued to develop. Workers
demonstrated to demand collective bargaining, while the ChNgoku District Committee and
Hiroshima Prefectural Committee of the JCP formed a Joint Struggle Committee for
Protection of Japan Steel Mill (Nikko kyodo toso iinkai) and a Struggle HQ of Japan Steel
Mill (Nikko toso honbu). Union leader and leader of the Hiroshima Prefectural Committee of
14
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the Japan Communist Party (JCP), Hayashi Haruchi, was placed in charge of tactics (senjutsu
iinkai) and Matsue Sumi (from the Ch;goku Shinbun) made chairman of the Committee.
Also founded was a Young Men’s Movement Corps (YMMC or seinen kodo tai) made up of
400 young members of the Nikko union.21
Nikko notified the discharged workers by certified mail and provided a list to the union.22 At
1 pm on the 11th, 2000 workers moved ‘about within the Company compound, arm in arm’.23
Hayashi, along with ‘several hundred’ union members, took Matsuoka (Chief of the Nikko
Personnel Affairs Section) to ‘an island spot located in a reservoir in front of the Company
office’ along with the Secretary Okubo. They used harassment tactics for seven hours in
order to try and convince Matsuoka and Okubo to set up an interview between Hayashi and
the Nikko president for the following day, which was unsuccessful. They dispersed around
11pm after Matsuoka collapsed from exhaustion.24
On the 12th, 30 members of the YMMC forced their way into the company staff conference
in the secretariat room, where discussions on dealing with the jiken were taking place. There
is some confusion in the documents as to what occurred next. One report states the YMMC
took acting Nikko chief, Itagaki, and some other company officials to the island/reservoir site.
There they held a ‘People’s Court’, and one JCP official, Kurokami, told them they would be
held there for 3-4 days unless the retrenchment plan was withdrawn. They were held for 18
hours, during which time four company officials collapsed from exhaustion and one sprained
an ankle.25 Another report states the YMMC demanded collective bargaining, which was
refused. Thereafter the union members attempted to trick or induce the executives into
coming out, including fake telephone calls at the watchman’s box for Itagaki, and telling the
other executives that Itagaki had collapsed. One executive was carried out by unionists, chair
21
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and all.26 In both versions, the executives refused to speak to the unionists. However, when
one unionist, Kitahira, asked Nagato, from the General Affairs Department and on
watchman’s duty, for a cigarette, Nagato replied: ‘I can’t give one to a beggar like you.’27
Nagato was taken to the island in the reservoir and not released until he had read a written
apology. In the evening, a Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC)28 official arrived to observe
proceedings, and an unidentified ‘Occupation force soldier’, in a moment of excitement as
executives were running upstairs for a ‘20 minute recess’ and were followed by unionist
Kurokami, pointed a gun at the latter’s chest. The soldier said that he ‘was not supporting the
company executives only. As he rushed at me with excited eyes, I pointed the pistol at his
breast in self-defence.’29
Meanwhile, a ‘Committee for Defense for Common Struggle of Japan Steel Mill’30 formed,
attracting support from the National Railway Workers’ Union, workers from the Mitsubishi
Shipbuilding Company, workers from the Mihara Rolling Stock Company, the League of
Koreans Residing in Japan, the Japan Iron and Steel Union, teachers’ unions, and the
Electrical Workers’ Union.31 By 13 June, the Hiroshima District Procurations Office began
investigations into the jiken as negotiations between labour and management began to break
down.32
Management withdrew from the negotiations and the company closed the factory on the 14th,
citing loss of confidence in their ability to protect the plant designated for reparations,33 the
possibility of bloodshed, refusal of employees to work rather than engage in union activities,
and the role of communists in leading the strike.34 Signs were posted around the factory
stating: ‘the Factory is closed and entry into it is prohibited. The people charged with the

26
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maintenance of reparations machinery, however, must work as usual.’35 Workers ignored this
notice, and turned up in order to conduct a ‘sit down’ strike. Around 45036 workers broke
down the gates and occupied the factory. Allied Military Government (AMG)37 officials
began to demand police intervention, while representatives of the various participating unions
made speeches encouraging the strikers to ‘continue to the bitter end’. Negotiations with
Nikko management also continued, and while management agreed to continue future
discussions with the union at a place suitable to both parties, they refused the ‘unconditional
return’ of the retrenched workers. 38
Small numbers of police began to arrive at Nikko, and other townspeople began to
demonstrate at the Funakoshi police station, asking ‘Why are you oppressing us?’39
Discussions between police, AMG, the governor of Hiroshima, Kusunose, and other members
of local government resulted in a decision to issue an order to union officials on the 15th. The
deputy governor made a broadcast over loudspeaker from a hill behind the factory demanding
withdrawal, but was drowned out by the sounds of sirens, bells, and singing of the
Internationale.40
On 15 June, 2000 police were mobilised and they evicted about 1000 workers from the
factory, and arrested around another 30 who refused to leave (all were later released). About
22 other workers were injured. Some strikers resisted by lying down to make it more difficult
to be arrested.41 The strikers remained outside of the gates, obstructing the building of
barricades, while the Committee for Defense for Common Struggle of Japan Steel Mill held
an emergency meeting. Members visited the governor’s office and made the following
statement:
35
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(a) The Governor was responsible for the unwarranted use of the police force;
(b) The Governor was requested to show the official document from the AMG;
(c) The Governor was requested to release the arrested strikers immediately.42

Meetings continued at the Matsuishi Dormitory at the Steel Works site, where the unionists
made the following resolution:
(a) The Japan Steel Works strike has already become a national and international problem and
will be developed still further;
(b) Everybody at the meeting would be expected as a matter of principle to remain at their place
and carry on the war of nerves;
(c) On the following day they would leave the dormitory and take up the same position they had
occupied after withdrawing from the factory and line up against the police. Their numbers
would be increased by the mobilization of 2,000 people from the Hiroshima Seamen’s Union
and Democratic Youth League;
(d) The Nippon Express Coy Trade Union, Hiroshima Seamen’s Union, Korean League and
Democratic Youth League would commence a display of force.43

Further ‘Anti-Suppression Meetings’ called for the re-opening of negotiations, immediate
payment of outstanding wages for May, lifting of the factory blockade, withdrawal of the
police force, and release of those arrested.44 In addition to the Japanese police, BCOF
provided military police, field security and military government liaison representatives as
‘observers’, and two troops of BCOF soldiers entered the building on the night of the 15th ‘in
view of rumours that workers in large numbers would attempt re-entry’.45
In the days that followed, workers continued to demonstrate outside the factory, some
throwing stones at police, and others held demonstrations in other areas. Unions visited town
offices carrying banners that read ‘Discharge of employees will smash local industries’ and
‘Staple foods must be sold on credit’.46 Factory re-entry attempts were made by some
demonstrators, and others threw objects such as stones and bricks at the factory, resulting in
the destruction of 12-foot double doors, four sections of factory fence, 40 panes of glass and

42
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four doors of the watchman’s office.47 The Struggle Committee continued to appeal for
public support, and the following postcard, while not related to the Nikko dispute but to
railway workers, is typical of such tactics:
The rehabilitation of railways has made considerable progress by the hard work of your
husband or brothers and sisters. The Management of the National Railways, however, is
now planning to discharge one fifth of its personnel and the HIROSHIMA Railway Control
Office has already made out the discharge plan. It is said that 3000 people will be
discharged in the HIROSHIMA Control Office Area but nothing is known as to who will be
dismissed. At present our wages are pitifully small and our living standards very low. If we
are sacked, there will be no alternative for us than to become beggars and to starve to death.
In order to prevent this we have set up within the National Railway Workers Union a
Campaign Committee and the members are prepared to fight for their lives. If your families
will join with us, our fight will be more effective.
We ask all you families to oppose this retrenchment by appealing to the Town and Village
Councils and also to send a post-card or a telegram to the Chief of the HIROSHIMA
Railway Control Office, Area Chiefs, and station-masters. If this proves unsuccessful, we
shall together open up direct negotiations with the Control Office Chief and HIROSHIMA
Divisional Chief.
Please participate in this movement to prevent your loved ones being sacked.
(signed) Campaign Committee
HIROSHIMA Branch of the National Railway Workers Union
29th June 1949.48

On the 17th of June, an agreement was reached between the Nikko union and management for
the payment of outstanding wages. Further, a meeting was held between the union and
management in the governor’s drawing room with the attendance of the governor and an
AMG representative. Recommendations were made for the transference of negotiations to the
Local Labour Relations Committee, a body to mediate labour disputes under the postwar
labour laws, and police were withdrawn from the Nikko site on the evening of the 17th.49
Three members of the Free Lawyers Society accused the governor with ‘excessive use of
authority, violence and injuries’ at Nikko.50

47
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However, the demonstrations did not dissipate. A large meeting/demonstration was held at
the Hiroshima Peace memorial on the 18th of June, with about 6000 people in attendance.
The following resolutions were made in writing:
1) Opposition to oppression;
2) Immediate release of arrested Unionists;
3) Opposition to Public Security Order;
4) Reduction of Police budget;
5) Complete enforcement of the 6-3 Education system;
6) Opposition to compulsory subscriptions;
7) To build the Peace City and protect industry;
8) Payment of medical benefits to injured strikers by the City;
9) Inquiry into the responsibility of the Mayor, Public Safety Committee Chairman and City
Police Chief;
10) Dissolution of the City Council;
11) Abolition of Yoshida Cabinet;
12) Setting up of Democratic People’s Government.51

This is quite a wide-ranging list, from support of some occupation reforms (education) to
aims with a strong political plant – the latter no doubt a worry to the AMG. A speech made by
Nait* ChichN of the JCP would have added to this concern, which declared the strike at Nikko
to be ‘the forerunner of the people’s revolution’.52 Demonstrations, meetings with the
governor and local officials, and declarations/resolutions continued to pour out at multiple
places in the aftermath of Nikko jiken. Then on 9 July, Hayashi Haruichi and Takeda Taichi
(the latter the Secretary-General of Hiroshima branch of National League of Metal Mine
Workers Unions) were arrested and charged with illegal detention.53 The retrenched workers
– the event that ignited the jiken – were not reinstated.
Interpretations and Representations
AUSTRALIAN
Australian occupation forces became involved in Nikko jiken at the request of the AMG.
However, the references to AMG in some documents are ambiguous and make it difficult to
ascertain the exact nature of Australian involvement. While AMG was essentially a US body,
51
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the Australian forces attached military liaison officers to AMG from January 1947.
Australian documents make reference to the involvement of Australian liaison personnel, but
Australia was still subject to the commands of US military government in its area of
administration. It is thus difficult to distinguish the exact actions of Australian and US forces.
Australian documents are very lean on details, especially considering (or perhaps directly due
to) their direct involvement in the incident. A cablegram to the Department of External
Affairs states:
A company of B.C.O.F. troops occupied the building on the night of the 15th in view of
rumour that workers in large numbers would attempt re-entry. Troops were withdrawn after
several hours when it became apparent that no further trouble would develop.54

An article by John Rich of the International News Service reported that ‘an Australian
spokesman’ described their involvement as a ‘routine exercise’ which involved a simple
‘inspection’, and outside the building, the Australians found 150 Japanese singing the
‘Internationale’.55 The tone of these reports is understated – there was no real problem, the
troops went in to back up the Japanese police and left again when there was nothing further to
be done. It is also interesting to note that the use of BCOF forces is not mentioned in some
Japanese reports – or at least the translated versions thereof. One of the most detailed
accounts of the jiken, a ‘Report by Hiroshima Prefectural Labour Department Administration
Section’ as translated by the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (CSDIC),
mentions the AMG, the CIC and ‘an Occupation force soldier’, but not specifically BCOF.56
UNITED STATES
CIC spot intelligence reports, as well as detailing the events, place them within the dominant
anti-communist discourse. One report called the incident ‘another in the current series of
JCP-instigated “guerilla” strikes, designed to culminate in a large-scale labor offensive in
August or September 1949’,57 and another noted that ‘tactics of open defiance of police and
governmental authority employed by strikers follow a pattern similar to that utilized by
Communist infiltrated unions in other recent strikes’.58 The US label given to the incident –
‘Hiroshima Area Committee Incident’ – further reveals this discourse: ‘Area Committee’ is a
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reference to the organisation of the JCP and therefore immediately de-legitimises any worker
grievances or actions as the sole product of the JCP. On Australian involvement, one report
states that the ‘use of BCOF troops on 15 June appears to have convinced the demonstrators
that they will achieve more through orderly negotiations’.59 Additionally, it seems to be a
little more than a ‘routine inspection’ – one CIC report claims the Australian forces entered at
11pm and remained until 2 am, during which strikers dispersed at 12.15am.60
REPARATIONS PLANT
The ability of both the Australian and US forces to act as an impartial observer in the dispute
was compromised as the factory had been designated as a reparations plant (the idea of
extracting reparations from Japan had not yet been entirely dropped, and I am not aware of
the final destination of the Nikko machinery). The plant was therefore under military
surveillance.61 The governor, Kusunose, repeatedly apologised to the unionists that it was his
duty to protect the reparations plant for the occupation forces. One of the Japanese
eyewitnesses to the dispute claimed:
Nikko was taken over as compensation … its machinery was confiscated and its factories
forced to stop operating as production plants. They tried to close Nikko factories in
Hiroshima … Occupation troops took machinery in those factories out to somewhere else.
The machine tools were excellent … Nikko had first-class machine tools in Japan at that
time, according to what I heard.62

The Nikko management posted notices in the factory stating that those working on reparations
machinery had to go back to work, even when the factory had been closed. When workers
first violated the notice of the factory closure, two officials, one from the AMG and one from
the CIC, met with Hayashi to inform him that the factory was ‘limited to persons charged
with the duty of protecting the reparations plant’ and demanded that everyone should leave.63
The events at Nikko, then, could also be construed as aimed at Nikko employers, local police
and authorities, and against the Occupation itself, as reparations would be a contributing
cause of Nikko’s financial difficulties and the subsequent loss of employment.
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JAPANESE EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS
There is conflict between the documentary evidence available and oral memory, the latter
supporting the idea that Australian involvement may have been a little more than a routine
inspection and the US role a little more intense than many documents state. Kabuto Hitoshi
worked at the Mitsubishi plant in Hiroshima, and joined the protests at Nikko in sympathy.
He spent the night of the 14th at Nikko and stayed until ejected in the early morning of the
15th. According to Kabuto-san, they were engaged in ‘collective bargaining’ with a Nikko
executive at the time. In his words:
While we were collectively bargaining late that night [in the courtyard], an officer of the
British Commonwealth troops … – we could tell [he was BCOF] from his clothes –
suddenly pulled out his gun and took the executive, the other party of the collective
bargaining. The executive was surrounded by everyone and besides the crowd, there
were soldiers including the officer of the British Commonwealth troops. The officer
suddenly showed his gun to the trade union members and took the executive out of the
place … This happened at around two or three am. Then, before dawn, everyone left
there was ejected by the police.64

Kabuto-san also described the process of being ‘ejected’:
When we left in serried formation, we were completely surrounded by the police officers
who tried to … roundup [everyone]. We agreed to leave Nikko in dressing rank
formation. A person at the front held a flag, followed by the official representatives of
each trade union, then the workers of Nikko and Hiroshima shipyard workers … then, we
[Mitsubishi workers] were at the very rear. I knew at that moment that the people at the
back would all be arrested …
As we were at the back, I was afraid of being arrested. What happened is that the police
officers pushed head-on the people going at the back … they pushed from behind. And
experienced and nasty police officers goaded us from further behind – poked us. Then
the ranks became disarrayed and the people at the back couldn’t bear it and tried to go
forward. As a result, the people in the middle got crowded out. The people at the front
could manage to get out … the gate … In addition, the people at the back began to
struggle as they were being goaded and police officers also tried to arrest them for
revolting against the police.65

There is certainly nothing in the US or Australian official reports about police treatment of
workers, or of involvement in ‘rescuing’ a company official. The Ch;goku Shinbun also
reported that armed police officers fired warning shots, and that ‘batons were used to beat’
workers.66
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A GENDERED PERSPECTIVE
On many levels Nikko jiken is a struggle of competing masculinities: of occupation soldiers
over all the occupied; of Japanese police forging a new/old postwar role over Japanese
workers; of police and soldiers working together to defeat dissenting groups engaged in
challenging the (re)establishing order; of Japanese workers against all authority, forging a
alternative masculine role to that of the soldier-worker – fighting for rights and livelihood
rather than nation and emperor. But a view missing from official accounts is the role of
women in jiken. The dominant post-occupation self-congratulatory discourse of the changes
to women’s rights in Japan obscures the experiences of women forging an alternative
discourse and path67 – especially working class women activists.
Watanbe Tamiko was a member of the National Railway Workers’ Union working in the
Shiga Machinery Depot, and joined the strikers at Nikko:
The railway factory dispatched trains, and people who were going to Japan Steel could
ride for free. So we all went to Hiroshima Station, flashing Red Flags. We felt so
uplifted … Even when police officers actually came to attack and take us on, we took the
officers’ hats or nightsticks, saying they were ‘war trophies’, and showed them to each
other. However, the officers came to beg to have them back. We felt sorry for them, so
we returned the items. However, what really vexed me was when we were shut out of the
factory, and the American [sic] army officers were looking down on us from the top of
the fence saying ‘hey, hey!’ When we peeked inside the factory, we saw the Red Flag
being burnt. We were so enraged that we were crying out eyes out.68

Shinmi Itoe worked at the Mitsubishi Dockyard in Hiroshima, became an official in the
Female Division of the union, and joined the striking workers at Nikko:
We loaded straw rice bags on to the truck from the Hiroshima Mitsubishi Dockyard’s
Labour Union and lots of Red Flags and went to support [the Nikko workers]. During the
strike it felt like a revolution was going to break out as soon as tomorrow. So we decided
we should bring more members from the Hiroshima Mitsubishi Dockyard. A few of us
went back and walked around and shouted in the company building: ‘let’s go to Nikko
and give our support!’
We were barricading ourselves inside the Nikko factory … We shut the main gate and
were sitting inside the gate. American [sic] soldiers came on a jeep. We thought that
they would stop in front of the gate, but they didn’t stop, so we ran away in panic. We
stayed overnight inside the building, but there were company people and American [sic]
soldiers too. We continued to glare at each other for two or three days [sic], but one early
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morning when it was still dark, a group of policemen came charging, pushing over the
factory fence made out of timber. We were ready for it. We linked each others’ arms,
establishing lines of human barricades. However, I heard the police say ‘break from
there, where the women are!’ We thought to ourselves, ‘we can’t let them look down on
us’. So we clung to each other and tried [to resist]. I realised the police were already
running around behind us as other parts of the barricade had broken … It was very
disappointing, but we were easily thrown outside the gate. There was a pond behind
where we were standing. There were many labour union members and police officers
being thrown into it. We were chanting slogans from outside the gate. Women were
crying so loudly.69

From these accounts, it appears the strikers were divided into gendered groups – and the
women were determined not to be looked down upon for being women, and participated with
enthusiasm. Conversely, the police viewed the group of women as a weakness to be exploited
in order to forcibly disperse the workers.
The Rhetorical Aftermath
While most of those arrested were released without charge, the Japanese police and the
occupation force accomplished what they had set out to achieve – to break the spirit of those
resisting the economic ‘reforms’ under the Dodge Line and to ‘democratise’ the labour
unions. When the Hiroshima Mitsubishi Dockyards announced their own retrenchment plan
in the wake of Nikko, Kabuto Hitoshi remembered that they did not strike: ‘we couldn’t.
Everyone had lost their bravery to fight after seeing the loss of Nikko workers with their own
eyes.’70 Kabuto-san was himself a victim of the ‘red purge’, as was Shinme Itoe.71 Kabutosan reminisced: ‘Those who were purged were activists of trade unions and communists. And
I’m sorry to tell you this, but sick people and genuinely lazy people were also included. I
think it was a sort of purge of the weak by the strong.’72 But many continued to protest and to
strike. In August 1949, the League of Koreans Residing in Japan (who participated at Nikko),
writing of a protest that turned violent in Shimonoseki (Shimonoseki jiken), invoked the
recent memory of Nikko jiken as inspiration:
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All democratic forces here in Hiroshima prefecture, after their harsh experience in the
Japan Steelworks Incident, are resolutely rising to the task of the decisive elimination
of police oppression.
Smash the rest of the terrorists in the Korean Residents Association!
Down with the police regime of the reactionary Yoshida cabinet.73

Apparently, the JCP leader Nosaka Sanzo also referred to Nikko jiken and other ‘labour riots’
as examples of ‘Fascist Yoshida’s tyrannical oppression’.74
The Soviets also found the jiken to be useful for political rhetoric. In a potent example of the
disparity between civilian and military goals and roles in the Occupation, at the same time
Australian troops were used to disperse Japanese workers and aid company officials at Nikko,
Australian delegates to the Far Eastern Commission (FEC)75 were putting forward a policy
proposal to save the right to strike and undertake collective bargaining for Japanese public
service employees (FEC 318/20).76 The Soviets opposed the Australian proposal on the
grounds that they thought they had a better one, thus Nikko jiken was used in an attempt to
discredit the Australian proposal. The Soviet representative to the FEC claimed Australia was
confusing the debate over labour policy, which could ‘possibly be explained by the fact that it
was Austral[ian] Occupation Tr[oops] that had been ordered to Steel Manufacturing plant in
Hiroshima when mobbing of workers by Jap[anese] police occurred’.77 The Soviet New
Times magazine reported that ‘Australian soldiers were used to suppress the workers in
Hiroshima’.78 Soviet attacks did not have much effect on discrediting the Australian proposal
(the US had already done that by claiming it would further the cause of communism in
Japan), but the fact the ‘debate’ occurred at all highlights the different approach to labour
issues taken by the military and civilian/diplomatic components of Australia’s occupation
participation.
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Conclusions and Postscripts
The case of Nikko jiken elucidates a number of contentious aspects of the Occupation,
particularly in terms of the so-called ‘reverse course’ of US policy where priorities turned
from political reform to economic recovery, and in the conflicting aims of the Occupation.
First, Nikko jiken attests to the level of worker militancy that existed during the occupation
era and provides evidence of its existence outside the main centres of Japan. Moore has
extensively documented this militancy in the more central areas of Japan and articulated its
potential as an alternative economic and political discourse in postwar Japan.79
Second, it demonstrates the disparity that existed between the aims of the Australian civilian
government and the Australian military strategic aims of the Occupation, especially over
politically contentious or sensitive issues. The government and its diplomatic representatives
(that is, through External Affairs) remained reformist in terms of its policy towards the
Japanese labour movement until the end of 1949;80 the military (and Department of Defence)
was much more sympathetic to the cold war policies of the United States. Additionally, it
demonstrates the conflict between some occupation reforms and aims. On the one hand, the
occupation aimed to liberate workers and change the dynamics and relations of power in
postwar, vis-à-vis wartime, Japan. A weak workforce was deemed to be one of the problems
that had helped lead Japan to war. Yet, on the other, the exaction of reparations as
punishment and to contribute to covering Allied war costs was another aim. These two
specific aims collided at Nikko jiken where the rights of workers had to be measured against
the need to protect a reparations plant.
Third, it illustrates the condoning of a militarised masculine power in Japan, despite the peace
constitution, although the ‘militarised’ could only be experienced vicariously through the
foreign occupiers. Male workers attempted to forge an alternative militant worker
masculinity, rather than the militarised masculinity of wartime, through worker action;
women workers pursued a more equitable and participatory social place in the role as activist
in contrast to the ‘good wife, wise mother’ image, which continued to penetrate Western
middle-class-inspired feminist ideas in Japan. Both of these alternatives were challenged in
Hiroshima by the combined domination of a male, foreign military force and a male,
authoritarian police force.
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Fourth, the jiken provides an example of the operation and implementation of occupation
policies at the peripheries, and of those occupied who offered resistance to occupation policy,
especially those targeting communist and leftwing activities during the ‘reverse course’. For
the workers of Hiroshima, Nikko jiken was/is a potent local or subnational symbol of the
‘reverse course’. It also demonstrates the relationships between the occupiers. While
Australian forces directly participated in dispersing the jiken on the night of the 15th,
representatives of the AMG and CIC were liaising with all Nikko parties before, during, and
after that date. Thus, the Australian ability to administrate its own area of responsibility was
tempered by the remaining small but more influential US presence.
Fifth, the labour dispute demonstrates the impact of the developing Cold War and its
accompanying rhetoric and framework on the workers of Japan. While there certainly was
talk of revolution and expressions of anti-government sentiment, there were also legitimate
concerns about livelihood and food. Discussion of the latter was submerged beneath the fear
of the former.
Finally, it exposes the collaboration between the occupation forces and conservative elements
in Japanese society (the police) who together focused not on the ‘rights’ of workers, or
whether they had legitimate grievances and what could be done to alleviate them, but on
maintaining order, control and, to a certain degree, the prewar status quo of power relations.
As Carter has noted, when Australian troops first arrived in Japan they were alarmed at the
lack of control the Japanese police force had over the population since the end of the war as
‘social stability was an important element in a peaceful occupation’.81 Australian soldiers,
specifically the provosts, helped to train the Japanese police, and general operational
cooperation between the two was constant. Such cooperation between Australians and local
police forces has continued in Australian operations overseas, for example recently in the
Solomon Islands.
Despite ultimate worker defeat at Nikko, the remnants of the divisive labour struggles in late
1940s Japan, between worker-controlled movements and the imperatives of a capital-led
economic recovery, subtly remain in Hiroshima today. Many of those workers present at
Nikko or similar disputes, often victims of the ‘red purge’ that followed, maintained their
stand of resistance throughout their lives, including remaining as members of the JCP and/or
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being involved in the peace and anti-nuclear movement.82 As for Nikko, it did not close down
due to poor finances. In 1958, Time Magazine reported that the Hiroshima plant of ‘Japan’s
biggest gunmaker, Nihon Seiko’, in 1957 ‘grossed [US]$61 million and gave employment to
more than 1500 Hiroshima citizens’ – primarily by making howitzers, a practice that
continues to this day.83 War saved Nikko – quite an ironic outcome considering Hiroshima’s
postwar status as an icon of peace. Overall, this micro-study of an industrial dispute in
occupied Japan reveals the impact of reform policies, occupation and local power, conflict,
and change in the peripheries of the Occupation, and continues to raise questions concerning
the main beneficiaries of the Occupation and how much was really transformed by the
experience.
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